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This paper develops a procedure for a comprehensive analysis of contractual relations in the production and marketing 
of potatoes, barley, and wheat in Idaho. The procedure focuses on analysis of contract choice by agricultural produc-
ers, processors and distributors; evaluation of the effectiveness of contract provisions; and analysis of the behavior of 
contract parties. The paper presents a review of related literature and a plan of activities to be performed, including 
the data-collection methods and the types of analyses to be used. The suggested methodology can be used to conduct 
a similar analysis in any agricultural-commodity market.
Structural changes taking place in the food-sup-
ply chain result in an extensive use of production 
and marketing contracts. For example, the share of 
the value of crops produced under various types 
of marketing and production contracts increased 
from 24.7 percent in 1991–93 to 30.8 percent in 
2003 (MacDonald and Korb 2006a). Furthermore, 
contractual arrangements have become much more 
complex. Increasing consolidation and concentra-
tion in different segments of the food-supply chain, 
technological progress, food-safety issues, changing 
consumer preferences, and globalization are some 
of the important determinants of the evolution of 
agricultural contracts and of the effectiveness of 
contractual relations.
An important factor influencing the use of 
various agricultural contracts has been changes in 
government support of agricultural producers. Dur-
ing recent years there had been a shift away from 
commodity price supports to de-coupled direct pay-
ments and a greater emphasis on the payments tied 
to conservation practices and programs. In light of 
these changes and in anticipation of further policy 
changes, crop producers should re-evaluate their 
production and marketing strategies; many of them 
should consider getting involved in production and 
marketing contracts that they did not use before, 
while accepting government payments. 
This paper develops a detailed procedure for a 
comprehensive analysis of contractual relations in 
the production and marketing of potatoes, barley, 
and wheat in Idaho. These crop markets have re-
ceived very limited attention in the literature. The 
procedure focuses on analysis of contract choice 
by agricultural producers, processors and distribu-
tors; evaluation of the effectiveness of contract 
provisions; and analysis of the behavior of con-
tract parties. The next section of the paper presents 
a literature review, which is followed by a section 
outlining a procedure for data collection and data 
analysis. 
Literature Review 
Studies that use actual contract data play an impor-
tant role in understanding the behavior of food-sup-
ply-chain participants. The number of these studies 
is relatively limited, as contract data are conﬁ  dential 
in many cases. The majority of the surveyed studies 
focused on the broiler and pork industries. These 
industries are characterized by the most extensive 
use of production contracts. Considerably less 
attention has been paid to fruits and vegetables, 
and contractual relations in crop industries have 
received very limited consideration. 
According to the research focus, the surveyed 
studies can be classiﬁ  ed into three major groups. 
The ﬁ  rst group analyzes the choice of a type of 
a contractual agreement by agricultural produc-
ers. The second group focuses on the analysis 
of contract provisions such as payment systems, 
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production practices, quality requirements, delivery 
conditions, and others. The third group examines 
various aspects of the behavior of contract parties 
when contracts are enforced. 
Numerous factors influence the choice of a 
particular contract. Risk-attitude of agricultural 
producers affects the choice between marketing 
contracts and production contracts. The purpose 
of any contract is to serve as a mechanism to share 
risks between an agricultural producer and a pro-
cessor (distributor). Several studies focused on the 
evaluation of various production and marketing 
risks under different contractual arrangements. 
Knoeber and Thurman (1995) examined risk shift-
ing under different payment schemes used in the 
broiler industry, and Martin (1997) analyzed risk 
shifting in pork-industry contractual arrangements. 
Hueth et al. (1999) and Wolf, Hueth, and Ligon 
(2001) examined the price and revenue risks associ-
ated with fruit and vegetable contracts.
The other important determinants of the contract 
choice are contract terms and conditions on sharing 
responsibilities between producers and processors 
(distributors), quality requirements, and the type 
of payment scheme. These aspects inﬂ  uencing the 
performance of agricultural producers in the hog 
industry were studied by Johnson and Foster (1994), 
Parcell and Langemeier (1997), and Gillespie and 
Eidman (1998). Lajili et al. (1997) analyzed the 
producers’ preferences for various contractual ar-
rangements in the grain industry. Goodhue et al. 
(2003) studied the producers’ choices of contracts 
conditional on the requirements to the quality of 
grapes grown in California.
The economic performance of contract parties 
depends on the clarity and economic effectiveness 
of the contractual provisions that they have to fol-
low. The most-studied contract provision is the 
payment system used in various types of contracts. 
Other contract provisions that received attention in 
the literature are the contract speciﬁ  c investments, 
agricultural inputs to be used, production practices 
to be followed, and contract duration. 
In the case of broiler and pork industries, the 
existing literature focuses on the evaluation of 
two types of payment schemes. One of them is a 
relative performance scheme (tournaments) and the 
other is an absolute performance scheme (ﬁ  xed-
performance).1 Knoeber (1989) and Knoeber and 
Thurman (1994) studied tournaments in the broiler 
industry. Tsoulouhas and Vukina (1999) focused on 
the choice of payment systems in the broiler, turkey, 
and pork industries. Levy and Vukina (2004) exam-
ined the welfare effects of tournaments and ﬁ  xed-
performance systems of payments in the broiler 
industry. Martin (1997) analyzed these two types 
of payment schemes in the pork industry. Jesse and 
Johnson (1970) evaluated the effect of the variation 
in contract provisions on the level of price speciﬁ  ed 
in green pea and sweet corn contracts. Similarly, 
Sykuta and Parcell (2003) analyzed how variation in 
the contract terms and conditions inﬂ  uenced speci-
ﬁ  cation of the base payment in identity-preserved 
soybean contracts. Finally, Ahearn, Banker, and 
MacDonald (2003) examined the impact of con-
tract provisions and producer characteristics on 
the level of contract price (fee) in corn and broiler 
contracts. 
Studies evaluating performance of contract par-
ties under different contractual arrangements usu-
ally focus on analysis of the allocation of decision 
rights, enforcement of contracts, and the behavior 
of contract parties. A distinct feature of many con-
tracts is that an integrator (processor or distributor) 
controls the decision-making process relating to 
the agricultural input to be used and/or production 
practices to be implemented. This happens because 
the integrator’s goal is to ensure a steady supply 
of a product with speciﬁ  c quality characteristics. 
In these situations, monitoring of performance 
of agricultural producers is an important step in 
enforcing these complex agreements. Hueth et al. 
(1999) and Wolf, Hueth, and Ligon (2001) studied 
the behavioral aspects of agricultural-input control 
and quality control in fruit and vegetable contracts 
in California. Sykuta and Parcell (2003) analyzed 
allocation of the agricultural input decision rights 
in the identity-preserved soybean contracts. Lee-
gomonchai and Vukina (2005) tested a hypothesis 
on possible agricultural-input discrimination in the 
broiler industry. 
Some types of contracts require agricultural 
producers to make substantial investments in fa-
cilities, such as animal houses and warehouses. In 
1 In the former case, an individual grower’s compensation 
depends on his performance relative to the performance 
of other growers. In the latter case, an individual grower’s 
compensation is based on his performance relative to a pre-
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the majority of cases these are contract-speciﬁ  c 
investments, as they are likely to have little value 
outside of a particular contract. If for any reason a 
contract is terminated, agricultural producers are 
not likely to recover these investments. Vukina 
and Leegomonchai (2006) analyzed investment 
behavior of producers involved in the broiler pro-
duction. A related issue to the investment decisions 
is the length of a contract. If a contract requires an 
agricultural producer to invest in a contract-speciﬁ  c 
asset, the speciﬁ  ed length of the contract affects 
the contract choice and the investment behavior 
of the agricultural producer. MacDonald and Korb 
(2006b) analyzed production-contract duration in 
the broiler industry; in particular, they focused on 
the incidence of short-term production contracts 
versus long-term contracts.
This literature review identiﬁ  es a number of 
problems that have received limited or no attention 
in the existing literature. First, contracts in produc-
tion and marketing of various crops have received 
a limited consideration. In particular, to the best 
of our knowledge there are no studies that analyze 
contractual relations in the potato and barley indus-
tries. Second, all existing studies have focused on 
one or a few relatively narrow problems. No study 
has developed a comprehensive methodology that 
could be used to analyze contractual relations in any 
agricultural market. Third, many data sets used in 
recent studies are outdated. Furthermore, there are 
no data sets characterizing contractual relations in 
the potato and barley industries, which are necessary 
to study the behavior and performance of contract 
parties in these markets. The present study develops 
a procedure for an empirical analysis of contractual 
relations in the potato, barley, and wheat industries 
which will be used in future work. 
Methodology 
Stage 1
A survey of theoretical, empirical, and legal lit-
erature analyzing contractual relations in the pro-
duction and marketing of agricultural products is 
conducted. The literature to be surveyed includes 
peer-reviewed journal publications, government 
reports, court decisions, industry magazines, staff 
papers, and other relevant publication sources. The 
crop industries, and speciﬁ  cally the potato, wheat, 
and barley industries, are subject to a more com-
prehensive analysis. 
Stage 2
Various types of contracts used in the potato, 
barley, and wheat industries are collected. Avail-
able contracts are analyzed to determine the most 
common types of contractual agreements and the 
typical differences among them for each industry. 
Furthermore, alternative formulations of the most 
common contract provisions are examined to iden-
tify the effects of differences among the alterna-
tive formulations on the economic performance of 
contract parties. This qualitative evaluation of the 
collected contracts and their terms and provisions 
is based on comparing and contrasting the types 
of contracts and the types of contract provisions. 
In particular, differences in the payment systems, 
delivery conditions, quality requirements, sharing 
responsibilities, and storage terms are to be ana-
lyzed.2
Stage 3
Information obtained at Stage 1 and Stage 2 is used 
to develop two comprehensive frameworks (meth-
odologies) for analysis of contractual relations in 
the crop industries. The ﬁ  rst framework is used to 
study the behavior of agricultural producers. The 
second framework is used to study the behavior 
of processors and distributors. Each methodology 
focuses on three major areas.
The ﬁ  rst area is analysis of the choice of the 
type(s) of contractual agreement(s) among those 
available in the industry. The industry participants 
use a wide range of marketing and production 
contracts. Typically, contracts differ due to the 
degree of an agribusiness company’s involvement 
in the agricultural production and marketing deci-
sions and the type of payment systems used. The 
characteristics of contract parties and the features of 
contract provisions affect the choice of a particular 
agreement in a particular situation.
The second area is evaluation of the effectiveness 
of the most common contract provisions and of the 
2 The examples of similar procedures are presented in Hueth 
et al. (1999), Wolf, Hueth, and Ligon (2001) and Sykuta and 
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alternative formulations of these provisions. The 
provisions to be considered are the product (service) 
deﬁ  nitions, speciﬁ  cation of the production practices 
and agricultural inputs to be used, payment systems, 
quality requirements and grading/weighting proce-
dures, delivery conditions, ﬁ  nancial terms, contract 
duration, dispute resolution, and others. The impact 
of differences in the alternative speciﬁ  cations of 
contract provisions on the economic performance 
(proﬁ  tability) of the food-chain participants is to 
be emphasized. 
The third area is analysis of the attitude, behav-
ior, and performance of the contract parties when 
contracts are enforced. Some of the elements to be 
examined are monitoring of production practices, 
quality control, advising, trust, and others. A par-
ticular focus is on analyzing the problems arising 
due to improper conduct of contract parties. To 
identify these problems, the analysis of court deci-
sions conducted at the ﬁ  rst stage is to be extended. 
This approach is useful because it reveals typical 
problems relating to the enforcement of contracts 
and to the behavior of contract parties. 
Stage 4
The comprehensive frameworks (methodologies) 
developed in Stage 3 are adapted to analyze con-
tractual relations in the potato, barley, and wheat 
industries. In particular, a number of surveys nec-
essary to collect data on the attitude, behavior, and 
performance of agricultural producers, processors, 
and distributors in the potato, barley, and wheat 
industries in Idaho is to be developed and con-
ducted.3
Stage 5
The survey results obtained in Stage 4 are processed 
to compile the data sets to be used in qualitative 
and quantitative (econometric) analysis. One of 
the ways to approach econometric analysis of this 
type of data is to estimate limited dependent-vari-
able models. The dependent variable in this type of 
model typically takes a value of 0 or 1; the latter cor-
responds to the chosen alternative or its incidence. 
In our case, it would be a choice (incidence) of either 
a certain contract type or an alternative formulation 
of a contract provision.
First, a regression analysis of the choice between 
production contracts (usually formal written con-
tracts) and marketing contracts (usually oral con-
tracts) is conducted. This choice is the dependent 
variable in the regression models. The independent 
variables (determinants of this choice) are the con-
tract provisions, market characteristics, and farmer 
(company) characteristics. Second, a regression 
analysis of the incidence of alternative formulations 
of the selected contract provisions is conducted. The 
incidence of one of the alternative formulations of a 
contract provision is the dependent variable in this 
type of model. The independent variables (deter-
minants of this incidence) are other contract provi-
sions, market characteristics, and farmer (company) 
characteristics. In cases where only two alternatives 
are available, a traditional probit or logit model is 
used. In cases where more than two alternatives 
are available, an ordered probit (logit) estimation 
procedure is available.4 The survey questionnaires 
include the type of questions that help construct the 
independent variables. 
Stage 6
A typical set of alternative contractual agreements 
used in each of the analyzed industries is selected 
to evaluate the proﬁ  tability of these alternatives. 
This analysis is based on evaluation of the costs 
and beneﬁ  ts associated with each of the alternative 
agreements. The production budgets and planning 
prices for potatoes, barley, and wheat in Idaho are 
available. This information, along with the contract 
information obtained earlier, is used to develop a 
number of simulation models to assess proﬁ  tability 
of the alternative contract schemes. Furthermore, 
various sources of production and marketing risks 
will be introduced in the simulation models to evalu-
ate the proﬁ  tability of the analyzed contract schemes 
under the alternative scenarios.5
3 A sample questionnaire is presented in Bolotova and Patterson 
(2007).
4 Tsoulouhas and Vukina (1999) used a similar approach 
to study the choice of the payment systems used in the 
broiler, turkey, and pork industries. Goodhue et al. (2003) 
evaluated the choice of the contract forms and of the selected 
contract provision used in the California wine-grape industry. 
MacDonald and Korb (2006b) examined the incidence of the 
long-term contracts versus short-term contracts in the broiler 
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Conclusion 
This paper develops a detailed procedure for an 
empirical analysis of contractual relations in the 
production and marketing of potatoes, barley, 
and wheat in Idaho. The procedure focuses on 
the analysis of contract choice, evaluation of the 
effectiveness of contract provisions, and analysis 
of the behavior of contract parties. This paper dis-
cusses the data collection methods and the types of 
analyses to be performed. The suggested methodol-
ogy can be used to conduct a similar analysis in any 
agricultural-commodity market.
The purpose of developing this procedure is for it 
to be used in future studies on contractual relations 
in crop industries, the results of which could be used 
in a number of ways. First, the results can help better 
understand the problems in contractual relations that 
food-chain participants encounter today. Second, 
agricultural producers and processors can better 
understand the contractual relations in which they 
are involved and how different types of contracts 
affect their economic performance (proﬁ  tability). 
Third, the results could be taken into account when 
new contracts are developed. Finally, the results 
of future studies would provide evidence on the 
performance of contractual relations in the potato, 
barley, and wheat industries, which could be used 
in the government decision-making process. 
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